Normative evolution in Europe: small states and republican peace by Lavdas, Kostas A.
A New Concept of European Federalism 
 
 
 
LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series 
Normative Evolution in Europe: 
Small States and Republican Peace      
Kostas A. Lavdas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEQS Paper No. 17/2010 
January 2010 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the editors or the LSE. 
© Kostas A. Lavdas 
Editorial Board 
Dr. Joan Costa-i-Font 
Dr. Vassilis Monastiriotis 
Dr. Jonathan White 
Ms. Katjana Gattermann 
 
Kostas A. Lavdas 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Normative Evolution in Europe: 
Small States and Republican Peace      
Kostas A. Lavdas*  
 
Abstract 
Understanding today’s EU requires a prism which is attentive to the interactions between the 
polity-building and world-inhabiting facets of the emerging polity. We cannot separate 
developing a theory of the EU as a polity from determining its placement in the world. 
Norms of cooperation become crucial in this endeavour: as they search for credible tools to 
interpret and master a changing Europe in a changing world, actors distil their experience in 
close and repeated cooperation with a view to enhancing their knowledge of and influence 
over complex games of advanced hyper-dependence. The normative underpinnings of 
today’s European construction can be approached in three steps. First, drawing inspiration 
from Thucydides, we demonstrate that the norms that count are neither religious in origin 
nor based primarily on custom and tradition. Next, we point to the significance of small states 
in norm development by explaining that the norms in question have been influenced by the 
practices and rationalizations associated with small-states behaviour, adaptability and 
survival. Finally, we suggest that the norms in question have evolved in interaction with a 
powerful current in Euro-Atlantic political thought and sensibility: republicanism. The paper 
identifies two main sets of norms in today’s EU: one stemming from previous experiences 
within the international system and the other developing with the new polity-in-the-making.  
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Normative Evolution in Europe: 
Small States and Republican Peace      
 
1. Introduction 
In the last few years, the European Union’s distinctive role in international affairs has 
found increasing political and academic recognition, continued to suffer attacks on 
its effectiveness, and been challenged by US transient unilateralism. Paradoxically, 
though, the question about what underpins the Union’s civilian image, and how to 
explain its peculiar projection of a mix of economic/ regulative/ normative/ military 
presence, and how we got here, remains elusive.  
In this context, small states in Europe have witnessed a remarkable combination of 
traits: their relative standing on the international scene has been strengthened (as a 
result of EU membership and its amplifying effects for a member’s voice) while 
norms they have championed (emphasis on the civilian and cultural projection of 
identity, on international law and institutions, and so on) have to a large extent 
become distinguishing features of the Union’s own international identity. Do small 
states utilize, and do they profess to utilize, different (or at any rate distinct) sets of 
norms? If so, what has been the influence exercised by such norms on EU politics? 
This paper argues that most aspects of ‘soft power’ owe much to normative traits 
associated with small-state behaviour in Europe. This is not the place to rehearse the 
familiar distinction, elaborated by Nye, between ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ (Nye 
2002). In short, soft power is an international actor’s ability to attract others to its 
goals and ways and make them want what it wants. As a special case of soft power, 
Manners (2002, 2006) and others advanced the notion of the EU’s ‘normative power’, 
based on its economic, political, and other civilian features. Various criticisms aside 
(e.g., Sjursen 2006), Manners’ insight that the earlier notion of a ‘civilian power 
Europe’ carried with it both Cold-War connotations and neo-colonial undertones 
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was to the point, as was his view that ‘the EU and its actions in world politics 
demand a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect on what it is, 
does and should do’ (Manners 2006: 184). This approach complements nicely 
Hoffmann’s view of the EC/EU as a ‘magnet’, capable of attracting others to its ways 
by being a role model and by offering the prospect of membership (Hoffmann 1995). 
The principle of ‘conditionality’ (including political conditionality) during accession 
negotiations enhances the EU’s ability to influence the applicant states’ preferences 
and institutions.  
This paper argues that, to account for the normative particularities of the EU’s 
internal operation and international role, we need to broaden the choice of 
conceptual tools at our disposal. Understanding today’s EU requires mastering the 
new challenges facing politics without losing sight of the European construction’s 
early objectives: maintaining peace in Europe and contributing to an open 
international political economy. It requires a prism which is attentive to the 
interactions between the polity-building and world-inhabiting facets of the EU as an 
emerging polity. Norms of cooperation become crucial in this: as they search for 
credible tools to interpret and master a changing Europe in a changing world, actors 
distil their experience in close and repeated cooperation with a view to enhancing 
their knowledge of and influence over complex games of advanced hyper-
dependence. 
Why do norms of international behaviour change over time? Slavery now appears 
abhorrent, while aggression across recognized borders has become unacceptable. In 
view of the interactive practices of Europeanization, on the one hand, and the 
reflective nature of the more advanced forms of normative thinking, on the other, an 
understanding of normative change requires us to delve deeper into the normative 
underpinnings of today’s European construction. The underpinnings in question can 
be better grasped in three steps. First, the norms of cooperation that count are neither 
religious nor based exclusively on custom and tradition; second, the norms in 
question have benefited from the practices and rationalization associated with small-
states behaviour, adaptability and survival; third, these are norms that have evolved 
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in interaction with a powerful current in Euro-Atlantic political thought and 
sensibility: republicanism. Today’s ‘normative power Europe’ is the result of a 
unique combination of a republican tradition of international thought and practice 
and the evolution of normative traits associated with small-state behaviour and 
small-state survival in Europe. 
This paper, then, introduces a grander project: it sketches a framework for the 
evolution of norms, in which conditions, ideas, and actors play different roles at 
different stages. 1 Applying this framework, it seeks to identify in political thought 
influential views on normative international patterns, aims to locate actors that have 
played key roles in helping particular norms acquire prominence, and it 
subsequently tackles norms of reciprocity as they become institutionalized in EU 
politics and policy. Accordingly, the paper first tackles norms and normative 
patterns (section 2). It then turns to (a) the contribution of Thucydides in clarifying 
the crucial point that the norms that count are neither religious in origin nor based 
primarily on custom and tradition (sections 3-4), (b) the role of small states in norm 
development in Europe (section 5), and (c) republican traditions of theorizing 
cooperation and peace (section 6). On the basis of the preceding analysis, the paper 
then proceeds – by way of offering a glimpse into a project in progress – to illuminate 
aspects of the normative operation of today’s EU (section 7). Finally, the concluding 
section (8) pulls together the threads of the argument, in an attempt to suggest a 
tentative framework for the study of the EU’s ‘normative power’. We identify two 
main sets of norms in today’s EU: one stemming from previous experiences within 
the international system and the other developing with the new polity-in-the-
making. 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 My views on norm evolution and, in particular, on norm prominence have been influenced by 
Florini (1996: 363-389). 
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2. Norms, agency, and conditional rationality    
Debating norms requires a consideration of the relations between the rational 
character of human action (the homo oeconomicus) on the one hand and its normative 
character on the other. The latter aspect has been the research domain of a norm and 
culture-based model of human action (put forward in modern social science by 
Durkheim, Parsons, and others).  
In matters social, political, economic, technical, or aesthetic, it is expectations that 
make the role of norms so crucial (Lavdas 2004). Norms serve to regulate activity 
and, ‘although we are not always conscious of them, we soon become aware of their 
power to regulate behaviour if we break one’ (MacKenzie 2009: 12). Of course, 
tackling norms is not the same as discussing moral issues. We need to be constantly 
reminded of the differences between ‘values’ and ‘norms’ (see, inter alia, Grimm 
1985). Debating values means debating conceptions of the good life, in accordance 
with which we ought to live. On the other hand, norms express expectations on the 
various settings of social action. They orient social action towards certain patterns, 
thereby reducing the complexity of social interaction, increasing predictability and 
specifying certain limiting routes out of an apparently endless repertoire of social 
action and interaction (Henecka 1985: 60-65). We comply with norms for a variety of 
reasons. Since norms refer to a number of areas of human endeavour (technical, 
aesthetic, economic, civic, and so on), reasons for compliance vary. They will depend 
on (a) the subject matter, (b) the particular constellation of factors encouraging 
compliance, and (c) the actors’ objectives in the short, medium and long-term. The 
weakening of norms entails acute problems in social interaction.2  
Certain norms acquire a binding codification, thereby turning into legal norms, laws, 
rules, and regulations. Indeed, relations between legal and other norms provide us 
with one of the most fascinating topics for analysis in the area of social, economic, 
and political interaction (Grimm 1985: 607-609). But because norms in general are 
                                                        
2 Indeed, Emile Durkheim’s concept of Anomie refers to the absence or the extreme weakening of 
norms, a situation in which patterns and expectations of social action appear to be confusing 
and/or irrelevant.  
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relative to temporal and spatial variation, focusing on norms opens the door for a 
discussion which eschews the binding dimensions associated with the analysis of 
values (Rorty 1987: 26-66).3 In fact, as we will see in the next section, when we 
investigate norms in the work of Thucydides, norms have originally been associated 
with custom and religion. Suffice it to note, at this point, that the contextual and 
contingent quality of most political truths renders the search for norms an even more 
crucial endeavour. We concentrate on the exegesis of patterns with transient force, 
drawing on a pragmatist approach to normativity in order to moderate the 
unavoidable role of binding institutions. We may agree on a set of norms even if we 
do not share the same values. 
Hence the question of how norms are to be applied to specific situations and the 
question of how values are to be applied to specific situations need to be approached 
differently. When it comes to norms, it is vital for our understanding to try to 
ascertain how they arise in the first place. Different types of norms may arise 
following different trajectories. Norms governing economic behaviour may emerge 
from interactions and get their shape in a process of historical formation or they may 
be dictated from the political system, their application being a matter which will 
depend on the prevailing politico-economic relations. On the international level, 
economic norms develop as a result of complex interactions between technical, 
economic, and political variables. In the post-Cold War world, the role of the 
American hyper-power presented US administrations with opportunities as well as 
constraints: the US faces tensions between system management responsibilities and 
specific national interests (Litwak 2007). The Bush administration post 9/11 stressed 
the latter, ultimately failing on both counts.  
 
                                                        
3 Since the 1970s, philosophical debates on norms and normativity tend to follow Joseph Raz. His 
Practical Reason and Norms became emblematic of an approach that allows reasons to dominate 
thinking about normativity. As John Broome put it, ‘some authors now believe normativity 
consists of little else. Raz himself says ‘‘the normativity of all that is normative consists in the way 
it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons.’’ All is reasons. But it is not. Reasons are 
undoubtedly important, but normativity has other important features, and our preoccupation 
with reasons distracts us away from them’ (Broome 2004: 28). As Professor Broome rightly 
suggests, we need to look at normativity more widely. The same applies to norms.  
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Yet different types of norms have something crucial in common: they all evolve 
because they are subject to selection (Florini 1996). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) 
suggest that norm influence can be understood as a three-stage process. The first 
stage is the emergence of a norm (which in fact means the emergence of a new, 
transformed/ mutant form of a norm); the second stage involves broad norm 
acceptance; and the third stage involves internalization. The first two stages are 
divided by a threshold or ‘tipping’ point, at which a critical mass of relevant actors 
adopt the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 894-909). What they call a third stage, 
however, is in fact a level-of-analysis shift within the contours of stage two. An 
alternative depiction of a norm’s life-cycle would involve norm mutation, norm 
prominence, and the norm getting challenged (Table 1). A new mutation, no matter 
how favourable to fitness, may require some help in getting established: it is actors 
that play key roles in helping particular norms acquire prominence. As Florini 
explains, ‘international norm prominence generally occurs either because someone is 
actively promoting the norm, or because the state where a mutant norm first arose 
happens to be particularly conspicuous’ (Florini 1996: 374).  
Table 1. A norm’s life-cycle  
Mutation  Prominence  Challenge   
Features of each 
stage 
Norm arises 
through changes in 
attributes of 
existing norms  
A critical mass of 
relevant actors 
adopt the norm 
Increasing numbers 
of relevant actors 
question aspects of 
the norm  
Mechanisms  Selection through 
trial and error OR 
emulation  
Conspicuous actors 
promote and/or 
endorse new norm   
Competition with 
other norms 
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Arguing that actors play a critical role in normative, economic, and political 
development is not the same as suggesting that the action that counts is always 
rational. In the first place, the consequences of rational action may depend on 
perceptions regarding norms and normative expectations. At both international and 
domestic levels, the role of norms underpinning policy decisions manifests itself at 
the stages of policy-making as well as policy implementation.  
Second, the combination of deliberate action and the intended and unintended 
consequences of action, some of which become institutionalized, is a force evident in 
political development. A long litany of writers in cognitive and social psychology 
challenged the notion that individuals are rational. Reason, like ideology, is at least 
partially a cultural and historical product. Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
structure of reasoning may vary across individuals, extending ‘to the formal quality 
of the associations people forge and the kinds of objects they can think about’ 
(Rosenberg 1991: 399). As Kindleberger explains, rational action in economic life 
‘does not imply that all actors have the same information, the same intelligence, the 
same experience and purposes’, while there is also the fallacy of composition which 
manifests itself from time to time when ‘individual actors all act rationally but in 
combination produce an irrational result, such as standing to get a better view as 
spectators in sport or, more dramatically, running for the exit in a theatre fire’ 
(Kindleberger 1989: 243). Cognitive dissonance can be another factor influencing 
rationality, while the very notion of ‘group think’ presupposes surrendering 
individual rationality to collective impulses. 
It would appear that the two claims – that agency matters and that agency is not 
always rational – converge in suggesting that political intervention is at once 
possible, consequential, and potentially risky. Nor is it the case that rationality can 
always settle policy dilemmas, once ideology has receded and ‘epistemic 
communities’ have a say. Because ideology, like reason, is a process, and because 
there is an isomorphic relationship between the activity of understanding and that of 
valuing (Rosenberg 1991: 399), it is the interpenetration of rational calculations and 
ideological impulses that gives policy norms their particular form and content. In 
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short, agency matters not because it is always rational; it matters because it 
interprets. And because it interprets (other actors’ actions as well as institutional 
dynamics) we need a reflective basis for assessing such interpretations in a 
globalized context.  
Discourses on internationalization and on globalization have tended to include 
phenomena that are novel as well as not-so-novel. It would be beyond the scope of 
this paper to rehearse the debates. What is significant, however, is the effort – 
advanced by thinkers such as Karl-Otto Apel – to mobilize philosophical and moral 
responsibility for the establishment of a novel order of human interaction that could 
be called ‘second-order globalization’ (Apel 2000: 137-155). The point here is to 
encourage a reflective modality that takes into account problems and prospects of 
humanity on a global level. This can only be achieved by never losing sight of the 
changing patterns of norms and normative expectations.  
 
3. Disentangling normative patterns: tradition, intellect,     
    and normative change in Thucydides    
From the prism of the present analysis, Thucydides’ crucial contribution is that the 
norms that count are neither religious in origin nor based primarily on custom and 
tradition. At the same time, mainstream neorealist and neoliberal arguments on the 
static nature of state interests appear to be exaggerated with reference (not just to 
recent constructivist analyses, but even) to Thucydides’ own work. This section 
argues that norms are the result of complex interactions that belie both traditionalist 
approaches to the religious foundations of normative behaviour and certain 
neorealist arguments on how to understand state interests. I read Thucydides’ 
History as a great narrative built around a number of thematic patterns.4 In 
attempting to reconstruct the dense Thucydidean narrative, I focus on three such 
thematic patterns in particular. First, the dynamics of contestation between and 
amongst what Thucydides calls homoiotropoi powers and diaforoi powers. Second, I 
                                                        
4 I use the Loeb edition throughout (Thucydides 1928).  
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focus on the process of disentangling normativity from the customary and religious 
norms prevailing among Greek poleis before the Peloponnesian War. Finally, I 
endeavour to cast light on what we may call the emancipation of ruthlessness; a 
normative break that came as an early result of the disentanglement, leading to grim 
consequences for those involved. Athenian imperialism became the main vehicle for 
that emancipation. 
Before turning to the three thematic patterns, we need to establish that Thucydides’ 
methodology is such that allows us to draw inferences that go beyond the acclaimed 
‘objectivity’ of a great chronicler. To begin with, the view of Thucydides as a ‘mere’ 
objective, great chronicler was justifiably undermined by early realist readings. The 
point, however, is that apart from the emphasis put by realist analysts on certain 
important aspects of the great historian’s work, the methodology which underlies the 
narrative allows for other, equally important, thematic patterns to develop through 
the History. For realists, the History of the Peloponnesian War was about seeking 
timeless truths on the state’s self-interested search for power, or the need to balance 
against the rise of such power. Werner Jaeger's classic study paved the way, 
emphasizing ‘this political necessity, the mere mathematics of power politics’: 
namely, that Sparta’s fearful response to the growth of Athenian power was ‘the true 
cause of the war’ (Jaeger 1976: 488). Morgenthau and others followed in these steps 
(Morgenthau 1978: 38). The fundamental realist proposition – that international 
relations is about states pursuing interests defined in terms of power – is one that 
realists recognized in Thucydides’ text.  
A number of other interpretive possibilities are now possible. As W. R. Connor 
observed several years ago, a new direction in Thucydidean studies emerged after 
the late 1960s, marked by an increasing interest in Thucydides' own emotional 
involvement in the events of which he writes (Connor 1977: 289). While this may 
have resulted in writings of uneven quality, it also opened the door to more 
sophisticated accounts of Thucydidean discourse. In particular, of greater import for 
my analysis is the suggestion put forward by Adam Parry, the distinguished 
classicist. Parry has shown that the means of expression employed by Thucydides 
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indicate that he was trying to harness the abstract vocabulary, which the Greeks were 
able to develop in the post-Homeric world, in order to simultaneously impose 
meaningful order and render ‘eternal’ the episodes in the History. A degree of 
abstraction was developed by Hesiod, and reached its height in Herodotus. But it is 
with Thucydides that we reach a ‘social abstraction’, i.e., a modality in writing in 
which abstract words appear as independent entities in sentences. Of course, they 
still imply human modalities, whereas with Aristotle another stage of abstraction is 
reached: abstract words need not refer to any human state or behaviour. Still, the 
remarkable thing about Thucydides is that he is analytical as well as engaged and 
that – as Parry (1970) suggests – the style to accomplish this is struggle: antithesis, 
variation, juxtaposition, a rather terse but also superbly condensed and meaningful 
discourse. For Thucydides, history is the search for the conditions that may 
encourage the intellect (gnome) imposing itself on reality, and the fundamental 
desideratum is a reality in which the intellect is in control of things.  
In this context, the degeneration of civilization brought about by war acquires a 
fundamental significance: in part because wars were a constant feature of reality 
(they still are, to a certain extent); in part due to the apocalyptic implications of war 
for the human soul. In a famous passage describing the revolution in Corcyra 
(7.82.2), a pensive Thucydides remarks that ‘war is a violent teacher’, one that 
imposes itself destroying practices, mores, and morality: ‘Ho de polemos biaios 
didaskalos kai pros ta paronta tas orgas ton pollon homoioi’ (7. 82. 2): war is a violent 
teacher, and brings the moods of most men into harmony with their present 
conditions. War subjugates everything sta paronta: ‘ta paronta – immediate, going 
reality assumes control of everything, and all language, including moral and political 
terms, becomes meaningless’ (Parry 1970: 19). In this and other passages, Thucydides 
is making a fascinating point about the relations between human possibilities, 
material conditions and the frailty of signification. He sensed that man was 
entrapped in a situation where force, the immediacy of threat, and chance were his 
masters (Parry 1970: 19).  
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Zooming in from the general role of war in deforming humanity to the particular 
conditions prevalent in the Hellenic system of international relations, Thucydides 
proceeds to distinguish between wars on the basis of whether the warring parties 
resemble each other in terms of regimes, institutions, and political culture. Indeed, 
the fact that the war between Athens and Sparta was a prolonged contest between 
diaforoi powers gave that conflict some of its distinguishing features. Conflict 
between homoiotropoi powers (such as, Thucydides suggests, Athens and Syracuse) 
may be more difficult to resolve in military terms, because of similar mentalities and 
the adoption of similar tactics: both Athens and Syracuse were competent at sea. On 
the other hand, conflict between diaforoi powers (such as Athens and Sparta) is of 
grander dimensions, as different systems and worldviews clash, but it may lend itself 
to easier military resolution (Thucydides 7.55, 8.96). At the same time, the cohesion of 
each bloc played a major role in the balance achieved, as Athens’ allies tended to 
have democratic or tyrannical regimes, while those that sided with Sparta were 
oligarchies.5 Unlike oligarchy, both tyranny and democracy6 were associated with 
financial enterprise, shipping, and expansionist thinking (Watson 2009: 52). War 
between Athens and Sparta became, in the end, a particularly protracted conflict. It 
led to direct confrontation over practices, institutions, and norms.  
At the beginning of the History of the Peloponnesian War, we encounter an eloquent 
analysis of the dispute over Epidamnus. When faced with the domestic upheaval at 
Epidamnus, Corcyra – one of the developing city-state’s founders – opted for 
detachment and neutrality. But when Epidamnus turned with success to the other 
founder, Corinth, Corcyra took offense. The Corcyraeans offer to submit their 
dispute with Corinth, that was also their own mother city, to arbitration in order to 
avoid further military conflict. At the same time, the Corcyraeans hope to be 
admitted to the Athenian alliance, a development opposed by their mother city (see 
                                                        
5 Regime type was a clear indicator of preference for an alliance, hence the willingness of both 
sides to intervene when called upon by domestic interests, in order to safeguard or topple a 
regime. Ste. Croix (1982, 1989) has asserted that the masses in the cities of the Athenian empire 
welcomed political subordination to Athens as the price to pay in order to be able to escape from 
the hated rule of their own oligarchs. That may explain the fact that, in most cases, revolts against 
Athens were the work of minorities. 
6 The first often led to the second as the tyrants who wanted to stay in power had to 
accommodate and gradually endorse the views of the polloi.  
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1. 24-45). The Corinthians considers the Corcyreans disloyal: they accuse the 
Corcyreans of ‘having revolted in violation of unwritten international Hellenic 
norms’ (Cohen 2006: 270). What the Corinthians emphasize to Athens is the 
significance and the universal value of international norms. By contrast, the 
Corcyreans appeal to Athenian self-interest: by admitting them into the alliance, the 
Athenians would be doing what is in their interest, which is more important than the 
rights and wrongs of the Corinthian claims about Corcyraean disloyalty and 
violation of international Hellenic norms. According to this view, which the 
Athenians endorsed, crucial strategic advantages would accrue to Athens by virtue 
of Corcyra’s location and sea power. The Athenians accepted the Corcyreans into the 
alliance, offending Corinth, which was Sparta’s ally but, as the course of the ensuing 
war proved, Corcyra never became an important asset to the Athenians (Cohen 2006: 
271). 
Aiming to keep Sparta out of the ensuing conflict, Athens dispatched an envoy to 
influence Spartan deliberations. The audacity of the Athenians’ speech at Sparta (in 
book One of the History) is a clear example of this novel approach to openly 
defending imperialism as a way of consolidating the city’s perceived superiority.7 
The Athenians openly recognize that their motives in building the empire were fear 
(δέος), honor (τιμή), and self-interest (ωφέλεια) (1. 75). Neither deliberately 
provocative nor retreating from a robust defense of their great power (Orwin 1986: 
72-85), the Athenians seek to avoid war, if possible, but not at the cost of diluting the 
perception of their superiority. This is a speech which on the one hand tends to 
vindicate the ‘balancing-against-power’ realist readings of Thucydides8 while on the 
other hand it exposes, as we will see, the foundations of a new ruthlessness.  
 
                                                        
7 As Alker observes, throughout the History speeches regularly come before the great actions (or 
‘motions’) (Alker 1988: 813-814). Paying particular attention to the context, Thucydides is clear 
on his interpretive as well as explanatory methodology: ‘My habit has been to make the speakers 
say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as 
closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said’ (1.21). 
8 The view that Thucydides’ analysis of the truest (‘αληθεστάτην’) cause of the war, i.e., that the 
growth of Athenian power brought fear to the Spartans and forced them to war (‘αναγκάσαι ες το 
πολεμείν’) (1. 23. 6), is a precursor to structuralist realist interpretations.  
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Athenian calculation, based on notions of short-term self-interest, proved myopic on 
various occasions in the 27-year war. As Thucydides insists time and again, it is the 
uncertainty inherent in human endeavours that makes it even more necessary for 
reasonable actors to plan beyond immediate gains. There is recognition, emphasized 
at various points throughout the History, that the future is uncertain and the fortunes 
of war constantly shifting. When things shift, the norms and institutions one ignored 
in order to seize a temporary advantage ‘may no longer be available for assistance 
when one is in unforeseen and dire need’ (Cohen 2006: 271).  
At the same time, Athens was undergoing a process of change from within. The 
Athenian polis of the Fifth Century, that became the quintessential paradigm of 
classical Greek antiquity, was transformed through protracted all-out war. Of course, 
the idealized account of the Athenian regime presented by Thucydides (in the 
Periclean Funeral Oration) has often been read through Roman republican eyes. In 
fact, Thucydides’s account of the Athenian regime emphasized both the civic 
commitment by the citizen and the confident and relaxed quality of life in Athens. 
The focus throughout was on the balance accomplished by Athenian political life (for 
free male citizens) between what we would call – in modern terms – participation 
and individual freedom, public-mindedness and respect for self-development: the 
civic greatness of the Periclean Age was exemplified in a civilized way of life, in 
culture and, characteristically, in the art of the Fifth Century (see Connor 1984). 
Thucydides is equally sophisticated in his analysis of the implications of the 
Peloponnesian War for domestic (Athenian) democracy. As the war conditions 
became chronic and peace appeared more and more elusive, the Athenian polity was 
transformed. Instead of a polis, Thucydides tells us, Athens gradually became a 
militarist system: as a result of the war, Athens came to resemble a fortress, while the 
city’s institutions, culture, and practices became seriously affected.9  
 
 
                                                        
9 See, e.g., at 7. 28: ‘των δε πάντων ομοίως επακτών εδείτο η πόλις, και αντί του πόλις είναι 
φρούριον κατέστη’.  
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4. City-states and normative contestation  
Normative struggle and normative emergence is at least as crucial an ingredient in 
Thucydides’ analysis as ‘power politics’. Cleon’s efforts, after the fall of Mytilene, to 
persuade the Athenians to kill all male inhabitants and sell women and children as 
slaves mark the first major departure from the moderate imperial policy advocated 
by Pericles. In the end, following fierce debate, Cleon did not succeed in persuading 
the Athenians, but the debate itself manifests the gap between the arguments 
advanced and the views that were dominant a decade before. Then a few years later, 
the Athenians inflicted on Melos the terror Cleon had tried to persuade them to 
inflict on Mytilene.  
It is in the context of the so-called Melian and Delian dialogues, that we find the most 
acute attempts to rationalise and legitimise the Athenians’ departure from the 
traditional norms of international relations in the Hellenic world. The cynicism 
evident in the Athenian statements in the famous passages that constitute the Melian 
Dialogue (5.84 – 5.113) has led scholars to the view that Thucydides presents, in 
effect, an Athenian hubris. Culminating in the statement that ‘right, as the world 
goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can 
and the weak suffer what they must’ (5.89), the Melian Dialogue has traditionally 
been cited as an example of imperial arrogance ultimately leading to imperial 
downfall.  
As Lebow (1984: 10-11) has observed, it is didactic to compare and contrast the 
Melian Dialogue with Pericles’ Funeral Oration, a famous passage also used by 
Thucydides to convey the Athenian approach to international hegemony: 
 ‘Delivered at the onset of the war, the Funeral Oration reflects a quiet 
self-confidence that derives from knowledge of Athenian power, 
political, economic and also moral [...] Athens need seek no 
opportunity to demonstrate resolve. Rather, Pericles argues, it should 
use its power moderately and only when necessary in defence of vital 
interests [...] The Periclean strategy was suitable to the Athens of 430 
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B.C., a power bursting with self-assurance and revelling in its political, 
economic and cultural ascendancy in the Hellenic world. However, 
thirteen years of war, broken only by a short-lived truce of three years, 
had changed Athenians' view of themselves and of the world [...]. In the 
process, they had often sacrificed principle for expediency and honour 
for interest and in doing so had transformed the nature of the 
Athenian alliance. Athens’ imperium was now held together less by the 
common interests of the member states and rather more by their fear 
of Athenian power’ (Lebow 1984: 10-11).  
Yet Thucydides goes further than that, and the point he makes is a much more 
interesting one. In a field of scholarship filled with hundreds of noteworthy 
contributions, it is Orwin’s (1989) analysis that comes close to grasping the 
significance of the Melian dialogue from an essentially political perspective. 
Although his focus is on the cognitive shifts associated with the evolving Athenian 
understanding of war, interests, and morality, Orwin’s work provides an erudite 
prism which may also be used as a step to further analysis. Orwin argues that the 
Athenian position, shifting but not inscrutable, ultimately implies ‘the emancipation 
of necessity from the gods, or the emergence of absolute necessity’. Unlike traditional 
piety, Athenian discourse (recognizing in practice certain exceptions to piety) implies 
that some things are more fundamental for human beings than piety. While the 
Athenians do not go so far as to deny that the gods chastise impiety, wherever it is 
willful (i.e., wherever it is truly impiety), they do deny ‘that the gods can reasonably 
expect us to put the sacred first, ahead of the necessities to which we are subject as 
human beings’ (Orwin 1989: 237). 
Orwin supports this ground-breaking approach with a stimulating reading of the 
Delian Debate. While from the point of view of a cursory reading of the Melian 
Dialogue it would appear that, for the Athenians, piety has lost all authority as a 
rule, passages such as the one concerning the occupation of the shrine of Apollo at 
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Delion indicate significant nuances, which – I would suggest – point to the normative 
mutation in progress.10 As he suggests, referring to the Delian dialogue, 
‘this neglected passage in book 4, in which the Athenians first extend 
their characteristic outlook on international relations to those 
between god and humankind, is crucial for grasping the logic of their 
unfolding political theology of imperialism. I mean that doctrine that 
achieves its zenith in the most notorious episode in Thucydides, the 
so-called Melian dialogue (5.84-113, esp. 103-5). Our passage is 
equally crucial, however, for grasping the discovery of the notion of 
political necessity in the strict sense, that is, of natural necessity as 
opposed to the radical contingency of a world ruled by gods-a 
discovery that is the basis of all real political philosophy or science’ 
(Orwin 1989: 237-238). 
 
There was clearly a clash involving cultural and broader civilizational dimensions. 
But what was novel about the Athenian approach, in addition to its combination of 
commercial prowess and expansion abroad and political sophistication at home, was 
the aspiration to overcome and redraft the norms of international coexistence. 
Arguing against the often constricting influences of communal mores and of 
religious norms, the Athenians claim they are both capable of and justified in aiming 
to transcend inherited mores. 
The point, further, is that Athenian emancipation from the traditional mores of an 
inter-communal system of international relations led to short-term and longer-term 
implications. The short-term emancipation of ruthlessness, apart from being 
abhorrent in ethical terms, did not serve the Athenians well: aiming to escape the 
limitations imposed by religious and traditional norms, they missed the opportunity 
                                                        
10 Orwin (1989: 237) makes the point with eloquence: ‘The Athenians -to speak very broadly -can 
live neither with piety nor without it. Without caring to observe its restrictions except where 
convenient, neither have they purged their souls of the hopes and fears that piety nurtures. [...] 
The crux of the Athenian argument is that even respect for the sacred must yield to the 
necessities of human life. Obviously this implies that such respect does not itself rank among 
these necessities’. 
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to reflect on the normative requirements for the pursuit of the long-term interest of 
the polis.  
Longer-term implications constitute a more complex field. After the Athenian 
capitulation, Corinthian and Theban demands that Athens be destroyed met with 
clear Spartan refusal (see Kagan 1987). But, crucially, Sparta’s refusal to oblige her 
allies was not based on religious or moral arguments. Not anymore. Instead, 
Spartans refused to destroy a city that had played a key role during the Persian 
Wars, at a time of grave danger for the entire Hellenic system of international 
relations.  
The role of norms has been the focus also of the work by Monoson and Loriaux 
(1998). But their unsurprising conclusion (that Thucydides suggests that it is 
precisely when the norms of moral conduct are disrupted that states and individuals 
find it difficult to chart a prudent course of action) flies in the face of Thucydides’ 
cold and analytical account of the Athenians’ playful approach to norms and norm 
influence in the Melian and Delian episodes. His overall secular approach 
encourages an analytical but certainly not detached approach to the adventures of 
the normative patterns prevalent in the Hellenic world before, during, and after the 
momentous War. And that is why he insists that the War he narrates is of immense 
importance to humanity: not because of the discovery of some laws of behaviour in 
international relations, as some realists would have us believe, but because of the 
momentous normative change brought about in the course of the conflict, smashing 
traditional mores, encouraging the mutation of norms and, ultimately, clearing the 
table for a rethinking of international conduct.   
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5. Small states and norm prominence     
Despite ‘smallness’, most European small states have been conspicuous as 
international actors, due to economic or financial centrality (Switzerland), early 
economic prowess combined with a robust civil society (the Netherlands), a key 
geographical position (Belgium, Greece), an imperial past combined with stable 
domestic arrangements (Austria), and so on. And they have tended to promote 
particular sets of international norms. 
Some of these states (with the addition of Denmark and Ireland and excepting 
Belgium, Greece, and the Netherlands) have tried to adapt long-standing traditions 
of neutrality to their new environments. Yet norms associated with neutrality have 
never been the most prominent among their contributions. First, because, as 
Thucydides suggests, an actors’ neutrality does not always increase the chances for 
peace. The continuing debates on the structural conditions leading to the 
Peloponnesian War notwithstanding, it is clear that the immediate causes of the War 
had a lot to do with neutrality: Corcyra’s attempt to remain neutral when faced with 
domestic upheaval and calls to intervene at Epidamnus, in effect invited intervention 
from Corinth, leading to hostilities between Corcyra and Corinth, both eventually 
appealing to Athens and to Sparta. At a later stage, the Melian ‘small-state’ evocation 
of neutrality led Athenians to the view that if Melos was allowed to opt out, any 
other ally would be tempted to do the same (see Rubin 1987: 355-356). Second, 
neutrality has not been the small states’ strongest normative contribution because of 
oscillations and, in most cases, eventual capitulation to the realities of international 
alliances. Indeed, even within the EU, despite initial strengthening of the small 
states’ voice, developments have led them to reconsider some of their earlier strategic 
choices in order to keep pace and exercise a degree of influence (Wivel 2005: 393-
412).       
There are norms, however, small states did help diffuse and acquire prominence. 
These include the civilian, economic, and cultural projection of international identity, 
the adherence to international law and institutions, and the emphasis on openness 
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and pragmatic cooperative solutions to problems of cooperation. Small states in 
Europe have generally been able to pursue successful and influential strategies of 
international adjustment, based on a clearer focus on a narrow set of economic 
interests and objectives than characterises the large states and on dynamic responses 
to the real or perceived conditions of vulnerability (Keohane 1971; Katzenstein 1985). 
In particular, Katzenstein (1985, 2003) explored the ways in which patterns of 
historical evolution of the small European states differ systematically from those of 
large states. Democratic corporatism promoted a dynamic adjustment, developing 
two lines of argument. The first compared small with large states. The second line of 
argument draw distinctions among the small European states, based on their internal 
characteristics. Even if, for most of these states, the era of democratic corporatism is 
no longer with us, the underlying assumption (i.e., that democratic small states have 
been able to live with change due to particular political responses they have been 
able to forge) is still relevant. This concurs with the conclusion reached by an IR 
specialist who is critical of neorealism:  
‘small state behaviour is not immune from domestic political 
influences. It may well be that small state foreign security policy can be 
viewed as a state-centric phenomenon in which military strategy is a 
response to international pressures. But this is a proposition to be 
tested empirically rather than one to be assumed a priori. Contrary to 
the state-centric approach, the cases I have examined reveal that even 
the most vulnerable states may display foreign policies explicable only 
in terms of domestic politics. This is especially true for weak states 
which are also domestically liberal’ (Elman 1995: 211).     
 
Revisiting the ‘small-states in IR’ literature, it is clear that much of the research on 
which it was based was stimulated by the findings of scholars such as Cameron, 
Garrett, and others, that openness (in states large and small) does not undercut 
national choice, including for social democratic regimes that seek to strike a balance 
between efficiency and equity. As Katzenstein concedes, ‘Garrett’s provocative 
analysis is a useful corrective to the view, widely shared in the 1990s, that footloose 
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capital was all but eliminating national choices. And it offers an excellent starting 
point for any analysis that wishes to probe in greater detail tendencies toward 
corporatist arrangements, for example, in some of the Mediterranean countries, 
Ireland or Finland’ (Katzenstein 2003: 11). But ‘small size was a code for something 
more important’ than just economic openness: it signified a politically salient 
perception of vulnerability, which in turn became closely linked to the ideology of 
social partnership (Katzenstein 2003: 11-12). Indeed, as Katzenstein is now eager to 
stress, ‘similar corporatist structures are filled with different social content’. In fact, 
the combination of structural and psychological factors was a major if somewhat 
unfocused concern in the early literature on the subject (see Keohane 1969: 292-293). 
But it failed to lead to a clear understanding of the interactions between norms, 
strategies, and institutions.  
As Keohane remarked in an early survey, ‘if Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make 
him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant’ 
(Keohane 1969: 310). Deprived of the possibility of relying primarily on the use of 
force, small states inhabit a universe that is norm-driven, certainly on paper but to a 
significant extent in practice as well. Evocation of international law and institutional 
procedures, appeal to rules of conduct, extensive use of the United Nations as a 
forum, succeeding (in Europe) in consolidating an amplification-effect of EU 
membership, and so on.    
These attributes have converged in bringing about a persistent preference for 
peaceful resolution of conflicts. Of course, variation does exist. Some of these states 
(like the Netherlands) boast considerable economic, technological, and cultural 
prowess. Still others (like Greece) possess most of the common normative attributes 
we identified, but they also exhibit unusual (for their size) military capabilities. 
Greece merits a closer examination in this respect: while unusual in its almost 
continuous bias in favour of an economy largely defined by high military spending, 
it still managed to adopt the cooperative attributes that eventually led to 
Europeanization and changes in state-economy relations. At the same time, however, 
it is unlikely that Europeanization will be able to move deeper in the absence of a 
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fundamental shift away from the consistent bias in favour of military spending 
(Lavdas 1997).  
In the course of the last fifty years, other actors – transnational interest groups, 
churches, foundations, media, a whole array of ‘non-governmental organizations’ – 
have developed, expanding in numbers and growing in significance. Such 
associations with an international focus go back a long way: various organizations 
(including women’s groups, the World Federalists, and others) were present at the 
San Francisco deliberations which led to the signing of the United Nations Charter in 
1945, ‘some being allowed to submit their viewpoints to the delegates’ (Kennedy 
2006: 216). There can be little doubt that today, the sheer number, range, and 
significance of NGOs are different. Still, the role of the normative patterns associated 
with small state behaviour in Europe remains indispensable. Being political-power 
structures, hence infinitely more legitimate in comparison to NGOs, no matter what 
the advocates of a ‘global civil society’ may claim, small European states have been 
conspicuous in their successful paths of adaptation, innovation, and survival. 
Successes in small-states strategies bring to the fore larger issues about political 
decisions, political will, and political responsibility. In section 2 of this paper, I 
suggested that political actors matter and they even become crucial during periods of 
crisis and re-adjustment. I concur with Lewin (2007) when he argues that politicians 
are not prisoners of historical forces: often they can opt for critical choices, choices 
that may lead to wide-ranging consequences. Political actors can therefore be held 
accountable for their actions. Blame avoidance rests on arguments that provide a 
ready refuge for politicians eager to avoid responsibility. And we should not be 
inclined to discount political accountability because of the trade-offs involved in 
consensus-building and coalition formation: consensual power-sharing 
arrangements often generate corrupt, collusive political systems (Lewin 2007). 
In most cases of successful policy reform, certain conditions have been present – no 
matter how important the differences and divergences. It is a political-science truism 
that  
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‘the greater the degree of autonomy or insulation that reorganization-
minded governments enjoyed, the greater the chances of success. The 
autonomy derives from three mutually reinforcing factors related to 
the electoral and constitutional system: the degree to which the 
electoral system and constitution created governing majorities; the 
willingness of fiscal bureaus to articulate market-based reorganization 
as a policy option and enact it administratively; and the degree to 
which politicians were sheltered from short-term political pressures’ 
(Schwartz 1994: 545).  
 
Small-states contribution has been twofold in this respect: persistent emphasis on 
openness and cooperation on the international front has helped focus political will at 
home, in the absence of majoritarian arrangements that would more directly 
encourage political responsibility.           
 
6. The republican current   
One cannot meaningfully speak of normative development without addressing 
issues of the changing form and content of the ideas that move actors. 
Republicanism, this section argues, provided the ideational platform against which 
new international norms acquired increased potency and a larger audience. It is a 
commonplace suggestion that the emergence of new normative queries in 
international political theory testifies to the transitory nature of some of the basic 
Westphalian premises. This has become more acute in view of the relative exhaustion 
of some of the great theoretical traditions. In this context, the impasse faced by the 
purest versions of both liberal and communitarian approaches led to renewed 
interest in a much older yet surprisingly relevant framework of thought. Indeed, 
faced with the achievements as well as the shortcomings of liberal thought, neo-
republican theory aims to reinvigorate a rich trans-Atlantic tradition of political 
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sensibility. The republican tradition has been renewed by thinkers of the calibre of 
Philip Pettit (1997, 1999, 2001) and Quentin Skinner (1998).  
This is not the place to rehearse at length the neo-republican argument.11 Unlike 
traditional republicans, neo-republican thinkers do not believe that society has the 
right to enforce morality. Less particularistic in outlook and more favourably 
inclined towards the significance of procedural guarantees, neo-republican thought 
acknowledges the need to keep the debates on norms and values separate, albeit 
mutually reinforcing. This also acknowledges empirical evidence concerning the 
diversity and pluralism of political commitments.12 Neo-republicans like Pettit (1997) 
recognise that modern citizens have multiple loyalties: toward their country, but also 
toward other points of reference, that could include their family, their friends, their 
colleagues, their ethnic, religious or cultural identities, and the associations to which 
they belong. Loyalty toward their political community may in fact be divided: 
citizens need not necessarily be committed first and foremost to their nation state; 
they may also feel loyalty toward their local community or toward the EU. Despite 
these provisos, loyalty toward the political community is a commitment that citizens 
ought to possess. From a liberal point of view it seems paramount that the latter 
commitment does not take precedence over autonomy and the institutions that 
guarantee such autonomy. The same applies to the republican notion of structural 
freedom (freedom as the absence of dependence and domination): commitment to 
the political community should not be allowed to defeat ‘freedom as non-
domination’ (Pettit 1997). Only a political community that guarantees republican 
freedom is worthy of civic commitment.  
A liberal rendering of republican sensitivities will defend civic commitment and civic 
virtues as general phenomena but will deplore the more determined efforts to mould 
civic life. Seen from this prism, a Republic of Europeans (Lavdas 2001; Lavdas and 
                                                        
11 For excellent overviews covering different aspects of the republican themes in their domestic 
and international applications see Brugger (1999), Schwarzmantel (2003) and Onuf (1998).  
12 Differences and variation in citizen orientations towards political phenomena comprise much 
of what makes political analysis a challenging field. Indeed, the analysis of contemporary 
democratic politics ‘ought to center on how varying citizen motivations affect the nature of 
popular government’ (Scalia 1991: 222).   
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Chryssochoou 2006) will aim to combine a sense of shared political and policy 
relevance at the EU level and multiple commitments at various levels, fields and 
areas of human action and civic activity. Even in the context of a classic republican 
work such as Machiavelli’s Prince, flexibility ultimately becomes the new meaning of 
virtue: ‘flexibility according to the times or situation’ (Mansfield 1985: xxiii). There is 
flexibility in political choice and in civic commitment and a strong emphasis on 
political skills and political persuasion (Viroli 2002), although there can be no 
escaping the basic normative requirements of a well-ordered political community. In 
the emerging, complex and multi-centred Euro-polity, there is a great risk in further 
diffusing responsibility and encouraging the politics of ‘blame avoidance’. It is 
therefore crucial to realize that accountability (emanating from the Greek conception 
of λόγον διδόναι) becomes a crucial parameter in the republican construction of a 
Euro-polity.  
But there is, of course, another republican framework which remains influential: 
‘Republicanism was the most influential political ideology in shaping 
the nature of successive regimes in France’s passage to and 
consolidation of modernity […]. A pragmatic ideology of government 
overlaid with idealism, it is broad, many-faceted and often-shifting, a 
blend of several currents in France’s socio-economic and political 
history. Essentially a compromise between various political and social 
traditions, its various forms have been determined at any one time by 
the balance of forces between the different elements pulling in 
different directions’ (Hewlett 2003: 44).  
 
It is ‘republicanism’ in this incarnation, as a dominant French ideology, which has 
been subjected to rigorous liberal criticism. The two ‘republicanisms’ are certainly 
distinct but, at least to an extent, mutually reinforcing. Rather than being an affront 
to the republican ideal, French republican practice – in its multi-faceted reality – 
tends to confirm at least some of the republican traits: universalism, defence of the 
possibility of a rational political order, a notion of freedom closely linked to popular 
Kostas A. Lavdas 
 
                                                                                                                                      
25 
sovereignty, and an emphasis on political participation. It is also, as Hewlett rightly 
stresses, open to a pragmatic approach to government.  
Europe’s post-war distinctiveness owes much to the adoption of a republican view of 
politics as a participatory exercise without losing sight of the requirements of 
pragmatism. In fact, an incomplete, regional example of ‘second-order globalization’  
(Apel 2000) has been evident in certain aspects of Europe’s political, economic, and 
intellectual development over the last sixty years. The combination of pragmatism 
and reflection on the substantive challenges facing humans (social problems, 
environmental degradation, empowerment of disadvantaged groups, and so on) 
produced a unique late-twentieth-century European mix of efficiency and social 
responsibility.  
Of course, the EU’s projection of its ‘soft power’ on the international level and 
Europe’s actual economic profile do not necessarily tell the same story. In terms of 
economic performance, today’s EU is a mixed bag. Euro-sclerosis has been a 
predicament only partly offset by the dynamism of economic and monetary union, 
while many structural problems remain (Alesina and Giavazzi 2006). Yet concerns 
about possible negative consequences of the euro and EMU (e.g., Schmitter 2006) 
have not been justified by developments. On the contrary, for the majority of 
member states it was the euro that helped moderate some of the implications of the 
2008 financial crisis. At the same time, however, the verdict is still open on the 
impact of monetary union on democracy. It is possible that domestic public 
institutions dealing with economic affairs gain more influence over other ministries, 
while central bankers at EU level ‘will find it easier to assert their monetarist 
priorities’ at the expense of officials championing economic expansion and 
employment (Schmitter 2006: 268). Schmitter succinctly formulated the question 
confronting us: ‘EMU makes Euro-democracy more necessary, but does it make it 
easier?’ (Schmitter 2006: 269).  
Exactly how significant a role the European experiment will play in the future of the 
market economy is not yet fully discernible. But the debate on different ‘models of 
capitalism’ (Coates 2000) has been recast. The political economy of privatization 
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(Lavdas 1996) and the shifts in cleavage lines (Kriesi 1998) have been reshaping 
public-private boundaries from Scandinavia to Southern Europe. There is a saying 
which rings true: ‘there’s more than one model of capitalism in the EU but certainly 
less than 27’ (the number of current member states). Both conformity (within the 
monetary union) and variation (in areas such as education and training) contribute to 
the EU’s composite politico-economic profile. At the same time, as the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) acquires some gravitas, analysts have been quick 
to ask whether a European strategic culture is emerging. A strategic culture is 
associated with the formation of goals as well as the choice of means. As an analyst 
asserts, ‘the structural shift from bipolarity to unipolarity caused a notable shift in 
the European defense industry’, encouraging a substantial increase in intra-European 
codevelopment and coproduction weapons projects (Jones 2008: 79). Elements of an 
emerging strategic culture in the EU need to be situated in the context of a distinctive 
political culture of European international relations.  
It is a political culture that has nurtured a multilevel republican conception of the 
world, a conception which was already transcending at a theoretical level the inside-
outside distinction during the very phase of the historical emergence of that 
distinction and even before its consolidation. It was Gibbon who, in the third volume 
of his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1781), made the observation that 
contemporary European affairs should be approached in terms of ‘one great 
republic’ emerging amidst the uneasy, fluctuating balance among the states of 
Europe (Headley 2008: 200-201). Citing reasons to support his thesis that it would be 
unlikely for Europe to suffer a reverse and decline such as ancient Rome suffered, 
Gibbon put forward the argument that the ‘manners of Europe’ were becoming 
increasingly dominant in the ‘civilized world’, while – at the same time – 
technological and scientific advances meant that before the barbarians may conquer, 
they ‘must cease to be barbarians’. A ‘republic’, in that context, implied a political 
order that was pluralistic and, at the same time, built around a core set of political 
values: political liberty, civic duty, limited but effective and responsible government. 
It was the remarkable amalgam of these features that made the metaphor possible 
and – to some – plausible in the first place. Of course, as Headley (2008) suggests, 
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Gibbon’s triumphalist vision of a ‘Europeanized’ affairs of the world cannot conceal 
an undercurrent of anxiety: the balance sustained by ‘temperate’ competition among 
the various parts of Europe’s ‘great republic’ may prove to be fragile, it may lead to 
added tensions, it may even result in conditions no longer conducive to the 
reproduction of those ‘manners of Europe’. In the absence of a Kantian underlying 
logic of a teleological project of humanity leading towards perpetual peace, the 
whole idea of a European Republic becomes a rather tentative one. What are the core 
features of the idea? The ‘manners of Europe’ and the balance among the ‘polished 
nations’, coupled with the outward reach of ‘European civilization’ (i.e., 
colonization), ‘inspired by the pure and generous love of science and mankind’. In 
other words, a distinctive political culture of European international relations, in 
which a multitude of states, large and small, shared the ‘manners of Europe’.  
As Deudney (2007) has argued, what can be construed as a republican security 
theory has its roots in approaches that aimed at the simultaneous avoidance of the 
extremes of hierarchy and anarchy. There are some pretty demanding requirements, 
though. On the one hand, domestic republicanism needs to be protected from 
external threats and domination. On the other hand, however, too strong an 
international projection of a republican polity’s power might be equally risky for 
domestic institutions. Republican security theory is attentive to the domestic 
implications of imperial dominance, which usually destroys domestic republican 
arrangements.  
But Deudney’s point is valuable: beginning in the early eighteenth century, several 
observers used the analogy between the political patterns of Europe as a whole and 
particular republican political systems. ‘Despite a wide recognition of Westphalia as 
a turning point, Enlightenment theorists commonly called it a type of ‘‘republic’’ 
rather than the ‘‘Westphalian system’’. Calling this new situation a species of 
‘‘republic’’ conveyed that Europe was not an anarchy and it was not a hierarchy’ 
(Deudney 2007: 139). This is no longer a normative rehearsal of the republican theme: 
it tackles contemporary concerns in IR theory. Indeed, according to Deudney, 
enlightenment republican theory was the first international system theory: ‘the Big 
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Bang of international theory’ (Deudney 2007: 157). For a number of years, rehearsing 
international theorizing from Kantian and republican prisms (Onuf 1998) has led to 
worthwhile ideas and normative hypotheses. Yet republican security theory shares a 
number of concerns with realism, while eschewing its pessimistic worldview. 
Security problems are real, difficult problems. They will not simply go away as a 
result of changed perceptions, enlightened socializing processes, or sheer good will. 
But they can be effectively mastered with the help of appropriate practices and 
appropriate structures (Deudney 2007: 270-271). 
This applies to republican security thought on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Interestingly, recent over-simplifications in regards to the state of the transatlantic 
relationship have tended to forget the republican dimension. Indeed, schematic 
accounts of perceived differences between ‘Kantian’ Europe and ‘Martian’ America 
(Kagan 2003) have failed to address the implications of what is distinctive in 
Europe’s political culture of IR, namely the early and recurring conception of the 
European states system not in terms of a Westphalian system but in terms of a 
republican, all-inclusive metaphor. The same, mutatis mutandis, applies to a second 
case of over-simplification, which is almost a mirror-image rendering of the first one. 
I mean the analyses which aim to elucidate the EU’s tentative steps in the direction of 
security and defense from the empirically unfounded prism of ‘balancing against’ 
perceived US hyper-power. Both misunderstandings – considering the EU’s 
economic, civilian and normative image (soft power) in terms of a peculiar post-Cold 
War Kantianism and reading the EU’s timid attempts at acquiring a minimal security 
capacity (hard power) in terms of an attempt to balance against US dominance – 
share a view of Euro-Atlantic relations which remains oblivious to the deep-rooted 
significance of the shared republican tradition. A tradition that gives priority to 
conceptions of justice and liberty, without necessarily eschewing the use of force 
when it comes to defending those values or a set of norms that guarantee a civilized 
form of life.  
It follows that the attempt to apply republican theory to the emerging EU political 
system cannot escape a complex, dual focus: the emergent republican properties of 
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the EU polity and the republican dimensions of the world of states and other actors 
of which the EU is now a part. Neither rigid hierarchy, nor unpredictable anarchy: 
the prevalence of diffuse and mixed reciprocity leads to the negotiation of shifting 
modalities of cooperation. Of course, there is conflict, at the minimum because of 
scarce resources coupled with the burden of inherited ideological and other 
preconceptions. But seen from this perspective, the debate on Europe’s international 
identity should not be allowed to gloss over the difficult issue of the relations 
between Europe’s internal dynamics and fragmentation and the Union’s outward 
image, action, and soft-power projection.  
 
7. Reciprocity and the evolution of EU politics 
When Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, pledged his country’s support for the 
efforts to establish a Jewish home in Palestine, the promise he made in 1917 had 
various consequences in international affairs for many years. Yet in a recently 
discovered document, we read Balfour stating that the promise was a tactical move 
to win support for Britain during the First World War; the British government never 
had any intention of honouring this pledge (McCauley 2006: 251). Tactical moves 
aiming to mislead other parties, promises made with no intention of keeping, are 
among the devices used in order to achieve various objectives in international 
politics. The ‘Balfourian tradition’ is evident in tactics used by Stalin, Churchill, and 
Roosevelt, among others (McCauley 2006: 251-252). 
Needless to say, deceit by pledge is not the most ruthless among the means used to 
gain advantage in world politics. But it is of special interest because of its borderline 
nature: it pretends to accomplish something by entering a tacit or explicit pact of 
some kind. It aims to entice rather than coerce. A pledge can therefore become the 
starting point for reciprocal exchanges between the parties concerned. Yet the crucial 
link is interpretation: in order to enter into a relationship of reciprocity, we need to 
read a pledge as a sign of good behaviour. This becomes even more significant when 
we consider the different types of reciprocal exchange.  
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Notions of reciprocity—returning good behaviour for good behaviour and bad for 
bad—are considered crucial for stabilizing cooperation by making non-cooperative 
behaviour unprofitable. Two basic patterns have been well recognized: specific 
reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity (see Keohane 1986). Specific reciprocity occurs 
when exchanges are seen as comparable in value and occur in strict sequence. In 
other words, in specific reciprocity, both actors in a relationship insist that the value 
of their concessions must be equivalent and that each must be made highly 
conditional on the other. The polar opposite pattern (diffuse reciprocity) is one in 
which the actors consider both the value and timing of individual concessions to be 
irrelevant. As Lepgold and others have suggested, there is evidence of stable, 
cooperative interaction in which exchanges fit neither of these patterns. In these 
situations, the pattern of interaction on either the timing or the value of the 
exchange—though not both—is deliberately left ‘unbalanced’, yet both parties remain 
satisfied. As Lepgold and Shambaugh argue, ‘unless observers are able to recognize 
these mixed types of reciprocated exchange patterns, they are likely to make faulty 
attributions about other actors’ behaviour and to misunderstand the causal factors 
that produce the behaviour’ (Lepgold and Shambaugh 2002: 230). 
The work on mixed reciprocity shows how we can identify four distinct patterns of 
reciprocity in terms of the two basic dimensions of social exchange on which it is 
based: contingency and equivalence. 
Contingency refers to the sequence and timing of an action taken by one actor in 
response to an action taken by another. A highly contingent action is one which is 
only taken in response to an action by another, and is taken fairly quickly thereafter. 
A less contingent action may take place after a longer period of time or even in 
advance of an action taken by another. Equivalence refers to a comparison of the 
perceived values of goods given and received. Theories of social exchange suggest 
that the value of any particular good is issue-, context-, and actor-specific and is not 
inherent to the good itself.  
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This line of argument indicates that the goods or actions exchanged need not be of 
objectively equal value to be considered equivalent and that the trade of two 
identical goods may not be considered an equivalent exchange. Rather than being a 
function of some objective value of the goods themselves, equivalence depends on 
how the exchange is subjectively evaluated. Equivalence becomes imprecise when 
the rate of exchange is either not specified or is inconsequential for the purposes of 
that particular exchange (Lepgold and Shambaugh 2002: 229-252).  
In Europe, after the Marshall Plan averted the spread of communism over the 
shattered European democracies following World War II, the institutionalization of 
ever expanding areas of European cooperation became the dominant project. It is 
worth noting that strategic action – initially by the US, at a later stage by France and 
other European states – became the critical variable determining the early phase. 
Specific reciprocity (Axelrod’s ‘tit-for-tat’ games) after the late 1940s can explain the 
absence of violent conflict in European international relations. Yet the 
institutionalization processes associated with the EC/EU can only be explained with 
reference to a combination of (a) strategies by a multitude of actors aimed at 
expanding cooperation, (b) the prevalence of diffuse and mixed reciprocity games, 
and (c) an encouraging international environment. Not all games are linked to 
diffuse reciprocity; some correspond to the mixed types suggested by Lepgold and 
Shambaugh. Indeed, games linked to partially unbalanced relationships constitute 
much that is worthy of careful examination when it comes to EU politics. 
Later developments manifest the crucial role of intense and widespread 
institutionalization of intra-EU interactions. Today, the EU utilizes and cultivates two 
sets of norms: one, stemming from previous experience in international organization; 
a second one, which is the result of decades of intense interstate as well as 
transnational cooperation and institutional fusion in post-war Europe. The first set 
comprises of norms associated with the avoidance of violent conflict, the prevalence 
of positive-sum games, and the role of epistemic communities. The second set has 
given us norms associated with the development of a multilevel conception of 
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citizenship and a complex model of governance predicated on post-national notions 
of authority and accountability.  
In dealing with EU politics, we can focus on the expectations of reciprocal exchange 
in terms of contingency (immediate /less immediate) and equivalence (precise 
/imprecise). While the analysis in Lepgold and Shambaugh (2002) does not 
specifically address the EU, we can utilize their approach in order to explicate the 
ways in which EU-specific ways of dealing with reciprocity may be useful in a 
broader perspective. In EU politics, at difficult and/or early points in cooperation, 
both actors demand strict contingency and precise equivalence from the other. As the 
horizon of cooperation expands, other modalities gain in weight, linked to diffuse 
and mixed models of reciprocity (see examples in Table 2). The main hypothesis is 
that the concepts used (such as subsidiarity, codecision, and so on) depend on how 
actors interpret (and then respond to) others’ policy moves and policy concessions.  
Table 2. EU actors’ expectations in four strategic contexts (adapted from Lepgold and 
Shambaugh 2002).  
CONTINGENCY 
EQUIVALENCE 
 Immediate  Less immediate  
Precise  Specific reciprocity: narrow 
exchange in strict sequence 
(mostly in Council of 
Ministers) 
Mixed:  
narrow, longer-term 
exchange (inter-member 
states deals, interest group-
Commission interactions)  
Imprecise  Mixed:  
broad exchange in strict 
sequence (certain policy 
areas, in Council of 
Ministers)    
Diffuse reciprocity: broad, 
longer-term exchange 
(European Council, certain 
policy areas in Council of 
Ministers)   
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Focusing on types of reciprocity can help explain the different ways in which 
political theory establishes the relationship between the domestic and the 
international. In the Westphalian era the clear distinction predominates, whereby the 
traditions of justice and the good life are considered to be relevant at the domestic 
level of analysis. The international level can at best accommodate specific reciprocity. 
The emergence of new normative queries in international political theory testifies to 
the transitory nature of some of the premises of the Westphalian era: ‘the increasing 
salience of the international is clearly one of the reasons why conventional political 
theory has been called in question in recent years, and the borders of (international) 
political theory are one of the most important sites of change in the way in which we 
understand our world’ (Brown 2000: 205). Small states played key roles in redefining 
international norms in the course of this long and tortuous transitional phase: they 
were keen to promote international institutions but also to use them, to persuade but 
also to cajole, to interact and to engage in reciprocal exchanges while at the same 
time attempting to strengthen their international position. Mutant norms of 
cooperation became fitter in the process, specific patterns of reciprocity remained 
strong in some areas while mixed or diffuse patterns arose in others, and small-
states’ conspicuous but largely harmless presence provided excellent promotion for 
international norms.  
Yet this is a process, uncertain and fragile, in which shifting modes of reciprocity 
may encourage or discourage further coexistence and cooperation. Kant thought that 
republican polities would enter into a treaty of perpetual peace. In fact, a republican 
peace would be a process rather than an end-state: conditioned by norms of 
reciprocity and challenged by shifts in their operation. In this process, the stability or 
instability of reciprocity norms will decide the next steps. Indeed, it is not accurate 
that all democracies refrain from fighting amongst themselves. It has been 
demonstrated that emerging democracies with unstable political institutions often 
associate themselves with both domestic and international violence and conflict 
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005).  
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If the intellectual context for this revival has been the ongoing debate between 
liberalism and the various communitarian and socialist critiques, the political context 
has clearly been the apparent triumph of neoconservatism. Views that explain the 
near absence of war between democracies by pointing to the structural attributes of 
democracies (division of powers, elections, and so forth) have been influential in the 
shaping and the promotion of the neoconservative agenda of promoting democracy 
abroad. Indeed, ‘the strategic program of promoting democracy revived 
neoconservatism and gave it new coherence and purpose’ (Ish-Shalom 2008: 96). 
Surveying a range of political science writings on state building and institutional 
reform, Fukuyama (2004) suggested that weak, corrupt and incompetent states in 
various parts of the world pose serious challenges for US international power in a 
post-9/11 constellation. While the EU’s soft power and the international 
organizations’ enforcement capabilities are fraught with problems and cannot deliver 
on the ground, the US has the capacity to pursue objectives. Restoring ‘stateness’ 
abroad with a multitude of instruments and methods, including the projection of soft 
power, becomes a key component of a stable international system: the ‘art of state-
building will be a key component of national power, as important as the ability to 
deploy traditional military force to the maintenance of world order’ (Fukuyama 2004: 
164). But is the US the most suitable actor to pursue this particular set of objectives?   
The EU’s rise to world-power status has been dependent on its economic and civilian 
successes. Tsatsos (2007) put forward the concept of a ‘sympolity’ in order to make 
sense of the complex interactions between demoi and states in today’s EU. Fabbrini 
(2007) suggests that the US and the EU are becoming two different species of the 
same political genus, i.e., ‘compound democracy’. A compound polity is a union of 
states and their citizens and ii fits well political systems ‘that have the features of 
both an interstate (confederal, intergovernmental) and a supra-state (federal, 
supranational) organization’ (Fabbrini 2007: 3). The political project – common to 
both the EU and the US – is to create a political union among states and their citizens. 
According to Fabbrini, the fundamental puzzle of compound democracies is that in 
order to maintain their ‘compoundness’, they need to diffuse power, but such 
diffusion of power, at its turn, hinders decisions and diminishes effectiveness. Unlike 
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authors who suggest that the EU and the US grow apart in terms of their domestic 
politics (Kopstein and Steinmo 2008), Fabbrini argues that structural systemic 
similarities become more and more important.  
It is in the world-inhabiting aspects that the EU and the US appear to grow more, not 
less, dissimilar. Kagan's (2003) critique of normative power Europe was based on the 
idea that it made a virtue out of a necessity. Has the EU actually the intention to be 
Kantian, he asked, or is it Kantian only because it cannot match the US which is 
resolutely Hobbesian? Instead of a more nuanced understanding of the normative 
dynamics of the EU, eclectic approaches to the particular constellation of Euro-
Atlantic republican norms have often resulted in over-simplified and misleading 
dichotomies (Kagan 2003: ‘Kantian Europe’ vs. ‘Martian America’). Discussing the 
EU’s ‘normative power’, Laïdi (2008) proposes to distinguish between ‘European 
Governance’ and ‘American Sovereignism.’ Despite common features that can be 
traced to republican security theory, the divergence between US ‘hard power’ and 
EU ‘soft power’ has grown further since 9/11. Republican security theory is attentive 
to the domestic implications of imperial dominance, which may destroy republican 
arrangements. As we have seen, this is an observation that – applied in a different 
context – was advanced by Thucydides in his analysis of the implications of the war 
for domestic (Athenian) democracy. As the war conditions became chronic and peace 
appeared elusive, the Athenian polity was transformed: it ‘resembled in fact rather a 
fortress than a polis’. 
Yet American ‘sovereignism’ may be evolving towards a tempered and more 
reflective version. The new US administration that resulted from the 2008 elections 
seems to be aware of the issues involved: it is increasingly becoming a commonplace 
suggestion that the use of US ‘hard power’ is quickly undermining its ‘soft power’, 
the consequences being far-reaching and multi-faceted (Slaughter & Hale 2008: 116-
117). Actually addressing this concern would cover a lot of ground towards 
rehabilitating a republican political culture of IR as a Euro-Atlantic construction.  
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8. Conclusion  
Normative approaches to international relations have come a long way since 
Thucydides. Although neorealists insist that capabilities determine relations and the 
balance of power (Waltz 1993), most would now agree that intentions matter as well 
as capabilities. But if intentions matter, then so do norms, which influence intentions, 
and they also impact motives. A recent formulation of a cultural-cum-normative 
approach to IR by Lebow (2008), insists on taking into account the motives of actors. 
Propensity for risk-taking, he argues, ‘varies not only in response to whether gains or 
losses are perceived to be at stake, but, more importantly, the nature of those gains 
and losses’ (Lebow 2008: 366). Of course, the nature of gains and losses can be 
construed in a number of ways. Following Thucydides, Lebow finds it useful to note 
that Greeks explained policy decisions ‘with reference to three distinct motives: fear, 
interest and honor’ (2008: 417). More refined views on the motives of actors are 
possible. The point, however, is that the evolutionary shift towards the prevalence of 
mixed and diffuse forms of reciprocity in European politics affects contents as well as 
tactics. A cultural theory of international relations remains extremely valuable, so 
long as it can provide links between the evolution of advanced forms of cooperation 
and transformations at the level of the content of actors’ strategies and, also, motives.  
Thucydides showed how the disentanglement of normativity from pre-established 
religious and moral codes opened the door for rational calculation, but he also 
showed that the prevalence of short-term, myopic, instrumental rationality led to 
grim consequences. Caught in the predicament which arises from the harsh demands 
of war, having escaped the requirements of religious norms and traditional morality, 
the actors are prone to miscalculations. In the tripartite scheme of motives suggested 
by Thucydides (and endorsed by Lebow and others), the move away from fear and 
honor would entail greater emphasis on rationality, provided that man is able to 
impose his intellect on the environment, which – as Thucydides clearly argued – was 
close to impossible in a situation of intense and prolonged warfare. 
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The international environment has been critical in the EC/EU’s efforts to impose a set 
of rules on a changing European political economy. The main implication is that we 
cannot develop a theory of the EU as a political system and then work out ‘on the 
side’ the issue of its relation to the world it inhabits. We need an understanding of 
the EU as an emerging polity that calls for a prism which is attentive to the 
interactions between the polity-building and world-inhabiting facets of the emergent 
entity. I suggested that norms of cooperation become crucial in this process because, 
as they search for credible tools to interpret and master a changing Europe in a 
changing world, actors distil their experience in close and repeated cooperation with 
a view to enhancing their knowledge of and influence over complex games of 
advanced hyper-dependence. 
Today, the EU utilizes and cultivates two sets of norms: one, stemming from 
previous experience in international organization; a second one, emanating from 
specifically European experience, is the result of decades of intense interstate as well 
as transnational cooperation and institutional fusion in post-war Europe. A deeper 
understanding of the role of norms in the projection of international identity, an 
agenda brought to the fore mainly by constructivist authors but also evident in more 
eclectic work in foreign policy analysis (Katzenstein 1996), requires a new emphasis 
on both the ideational and the material factors at play. From the perspective of an 
analysis of today’s EU political system, the role of norms of advanced cooperation in 
EU institutional and political processes can be explicated with the help of a 
framework proposed by Lepgold and others. In EU politics, at early stages in 
cooperation, actors demand strict contingency and precise equivalence from each 
other. As the horizon of cooperation expands, other modalities gain in weight, linked 
to diffuse and mixed models of advanced reciprocity. Norms associated with 
advanced reciprocity can be assessed in the context of what Apel calls ‘second-order 
globalization’: a novel order of human interaction encouraging a reflective modality 
that takes into account problems and prospects of humanity on a global level.  
Hence it would appear that today’s ‘normative power Europe’ is the result of a 
unique combination of a republican tradition of international thought and practice 
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and normative traits associated with small-state behaviour and small-state survival 
in Europe. Small states have played key roles in helping certain international norms 
attain prominence: they have been keen to promote international institutions but also 
to use them, to persuade but also to cajole, to coerce but also to coax, to interact and 
to engage in reciprocal exchanges while at the same time attempting to inveigle a 
pass to international status. Mutant norms of cooperation became fitter in the 
process, and small-states’ conspicuous but largely harmless presence provided 
excellent promotion.  
In broad summation, I have sought to sketch a framework for the evolution of 
norms, in which ideas as well as actors play key roles at different stages. A fuller 
application of this framework would entail conceptual discussion (presented herein), 
and a number of case studies. In the present paper, I identified in political thought 
influential views on normative international patterns, before focusing on actors and 
processes that have helped norms of diffuse and mixed reciprocity acquire 
prominence. Partly as a result of such combined ideational and practical influences, 
norms of advanced cooperation have become institutionalized in EU politics and 
policy, while the projection of the EU’s normative power owes much to conceptions 
of republican security and republican peace. Indeed, a republican notion of peace, 
robbed of its Kantian teleology, is not unlike Cavafy’s Ithaca: as we strive to reach it 
we become ‘wiser, full of experience’ – and, I would add, more capable of a reflective 
view on norms and normative change.     
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